Modern Operating Systems by Herbert Bos ...
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Modern Operating Systems by Herbert Bos and Andrew...
Modern_Operating_Systems_by_Herbert_Bos_and_Andrew_S._Tanenbaum_4th_Ed.pdf-M ODERN O PERATING S YSTEMS
Modern Operating Systems by Herbert...
Modern_Operating_Systems_by_Herbert_Bos_and_Andrew_S._Tanenbaum_4th_Ed.pdf-M ODERN O PERATING S YSTEMS
Page 657
First, the challenging party creates an unpredictable value of, for example, 160
bits. This value, known as a
, is simply a unique identifier for this verifica-
tion request. It serves to prevent an attacker from recording the response to one re-
mote attestation request, changing the configuration on the attesting party and then
simply replaying the previous response for all subsequent attestation requests. By
incorporating a nonce in the protocol, such replays are not possible. When the
attesting side receives the attestation request (with the nonce), it uses the TPM to
create a signature (with its unique and unforgeable key) for the concatenation of
the nonce and the value of the PCR. It then sends back this signature, the nonce,
the value of the PCR, and hashes for the bootloader, the kernel, and the application.
The challenging party first checks the signature and the nonce. Next, it looks up
the three hashes in its database of trusted bootloaders, kernels, and applications. If
they are not there, the attestation fails. Otherwise, the challenging party re-creates
the combined hash of all three components and compares it to the value of the PCR
received from the attesting side. If the values match, the challenging side is sure
that the attesting side was started with exactly those three components. The signed
result prevents attackers from forging the result, and since we know that the trusted
bootloader performs the appropriate measurement of the kernel and the kernel in
turn measures the application, no other code configuration could have produced the
same hash chain.
TPM has a variety of other uses that we do not have space to get into. Inter-
estingly enough, the one thing TPM does not do is make computers more secure
against external attacks. What it really focuses on is using cryptography to prevent
users from doing anything not approved directly or indirectly by whoever controls
the TPM.
If you would like to learn more about this subject, the article on Trusted
Computing in the Wikipedia is a good place to start.
computer system must require all users to be authenticated at
login time. After all, if the operating system cannot be sure who the user is, it can-
not know which files and other resources he can access. While authentication may
sound like a trivial topic, it is a bit more complicated than you might expect. Read
User authentication is one of those things we meant by ‘‘ontogeny recapitu-
lates phylogeny’’ in Sec. 1.5.7.
Early mainframes, such as the ENIAC, did not
have an operating system, let alone a login procedure. Later mainframe batch and
timesharing systems generally did have a login procedure for authenticating jobs
and users.
Early minicomputers (e.g., PDP-1 and PDP-8) did not have a login procedure,
but with the spread of UNIX on the PDP-11 minicomputer, logging in was again
needed. Early personal computers (e.g., Apple II and the original IBM PC) did not

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